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After weeks of nonviolent protest in the Northern Amazon of Peru, President Alan Garcia 
and the indigenous group AIDESEP appeared to be in a standoff. The organization claimed that 
Garcia’s recent decree loosening restrictions on mining, lumbering and oil exploitation in large 
swaths of rainforest were infringing on the property rights of indigenous Amazonians and 
threatening the “the lungs of the earth.” On June 8, 2009, government police forces had had 
enough. They fired tear gas tanks and live ammunition into the crowd killing approximately 40 
individuals. The demonstrators remained persistent - they quickly responded to the attacks 
killing nine police officers and burning several government buildings to the ground. The violent 
repression immediately attracted international attention casting light on Peru’s indigenous 
organizations and the values they stood for. In this particular instance, President Garcia had 
recently enacted the “law of the Jungle” granting private companies virtually indiscriminate 
access to 70% of the Peruvian Amazon. When protesters refused to capitulate, Garcia reacted 
with deadly force – a costly mistake. International attention responded quickly demonizing the 
attacks as Garcia’s public approval ratings dropped dramatically. He had no choice but to 
abandon his plans for privatization (Renique 330).  
 This story is not alone. Throughout the Andean region of Latin America, indigenous 
peoples have grouped together in forming powerful civic organizations with cohesive interests 
and articulated demands. Bound together by a history of colonial exploitation, Peru, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador all share a similar pattern in contemporary development. Since the dawn of the 21st 
century, governments have quickly recognized that they can no longer afford to ignore the 
marginalized masses. While Latin America is no stranger to government exercising violent 
oppression, such instances have become increasingly rare in the democratizing region. The 
explosion of civil society organizations has helped fuel the expansion of political parties by 
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influencing their platforms and holding elected officials accountable to campaign promises 
(Brysk 154).  
This paper will examine the influence of social movements in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador 
to determine their effectiveness in achieving their demands and contributing to the strength of 
democratic institutions. Because demands are often mediated by political parties, I will also 
address the complex relationship between social movements and their electoral aspirations. First 
we will explore each country’s political, social, and economic development through multiple 
indicators and statistical data. We will then examine the contemporary history of each Andean 
country and the role of social movements in shaping the path towards democracy. Due to the 
common Incan heritage of the Andes, special emphasis will be placed on organization among 
indigenous peoples and their recent political aspirations. Finally I will analyze the research and 
draw broad conclusions on how these social movements have influenced the democratic 
development of the region.  
 
Political and Economic Overview 
 Much of Peru’s recent history has been characterized by political instability and 
economic troubles. It has only been in the last 20 years that Peru has obtained sustained 
economic growth through recent market reforms earning it the title of an “emerging economy.” 
The privatization has spurred foreign direct investment and firmly integrated the country into the 
global economy. Peru’s current GDP is approximately $275 billion and growth is currently listed 
at 8.6%, one of the highest In Latin America despite the recent global financial meltdown. The 
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity) is $9,330 firmly establishing it as a middle income 
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country (85th in the world). While poverty has rapidly reduced over the last 6 years (in 2004, 
nearly half the country’s population was under the poverty line), 34.8% of the people continue to 
struggle in poverty with 11.5% in extreme poverty (ECLAC 2010). Similar to many other Latin 
American nations, Peru possesses a high income inequality with a Gini index of 49.8 (compared 
to 40.8 in the United States). Much of this inequality is reflected in living patterns as poverty is 
particularly high in rural areas (CountryWatch). The United Nations Human Development Index 
lists Peru 63rd in the world with a 0.723 marking. This is a relatively strong score within Latin 
America outperformed only by the Southern Cone countries. The Human Development Index 
factors GNI per-capita, literacy education, and life expectancy into account.  
CountryWatch’s political risk index is based on numerous criteria including political 
stability and representation, democratic accountability, security and crime, human development 
and jurisprudence. With a score of 10 indicating the lowest political risk, Peru is listed at 7 while 
the United States was given a 9.5. Additionally Freedom House labels Peru as “free” with 
relatively strong marks under “political rights” (2) and slightly less under “civil liberties” (3) 
(CountryWatch). Typically research has shown that these institutional performances are or will become 
congruent with public opinion and desire for democracy. For example, in the years prior to Mexico’s 
transition into democratic competitiveness, public opinion indicated strong support for democracy 
(Seligson et al. 10).  
Ecuador similarly shares Peru’s difficult history in obtaining democratic institutions. The 
small country spans the northern limits of the Incan Empire leaving it with an indigenous 
population of approximately 20%. Oil provides a significant source of income for the country 
(member of OPEC), though it remains vulnerable to fluctuations in price. However, Ecuador’s 
greatest export is its citizens who provide roughly $1.7 billion in remittances generally from the 
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United States (Kuecker 103). The current GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity) is $7,776 
placing it 93rd in the world (IMF 2010). GDP growth is relatively low as of 2010 expanding at 
2.4%. Ecuador’s Human Development Index of 0.695 places it 77th in the world offsetting its 
low per capita income with decent rates of education and literacy (highest among women). Like 
Peru, Ecuador possesses high income inequality with a Gini Index of 43.7. Wealth is largely 
concentrated in its main cities of Guayaquil and Quito. The country was hit hard by the global 
economic recession raising its poverty level to nearly 40% despite recent gains. Freedom House 
lists Ecuador as partly free with a 3,3 rating and the Political Risk Index has been assessed at 6 
(CountryWatch). 
By economic indicators, Bolivia is last among the Andean countries. Not surprisingly, 
Bolivia also possessed the largest indigenous presence composing approximately 60% of the 
population. There is significant regional differences in interest with Indians concentrated in the 
highlands and conservative landholders living in the Santa Cruz region. Despite the lack of 
national unity, the country’s demographic distribution lends to a high degree of social 
mobilization. The United Nations places it in a lower developmental tier with an HDI of 0.643 
(95th in the world). The GDP per capita (PPP) is significantly lower than Peru and Ecuador at 
$4,592 (IMF 2010). The country has shown adequate signs of growth (3.4%). The amount of 
people living below the poverty line is estimated at 62.7% and the country’s Gini Index is listed 
at 44.7 (CountryWatch). Little data exists to judge the performance of President Evo Morales 
who ran on a campaign of indigenous support with left-leaning goals of reducing poverty and 
income inequality. Though Freedom House lists the country as partly free (3,3) with a Political 
Risk Index of 5.5, recent research appears to indicate that civil liberties and political rights have 
expanded under the new President (Madrid et al. 4). 
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History of Social Organization:  
The ideological extremes of military rule and Marxist opposition that gripped Latin 
America throughout the Cold War era effectively eliminated any significant development of 
peaceful civil society organizations. The intellectual embrace of Marxism placed complete trust 
in the state and ostracized private, reform-minded social organizations. Similarly, military 
regimes clamped down on all forms of opposition often through terror and imprisonment. They 
advocated Washington Consensus policies proscribing unfettered free market capitalism with 
minimal state intervention (neoliberalism). While the reforms may stabilize the economy, it often 
marginalized the lower classes that typically composed the political left. This lasting legacy of 
distrust can still be witnessed through the common grievances of many civic organizations today 
(Baker 52). Neoliberalism can also be credited for the rapid expansion of civil society. This 
economic structure challenged not only the autonomy of indigenous groups but also their 
standard of living and employment opportunities. At the same time, however, the international 
institutions pushing neoliberal reforms also advocated democratic reforms in the political 
structure. Flexible, representative governments undermined the typical political and social base 
needed for revolution (Eckstein 355). With the end of the Cold War, Latin American 
philosophical thought began to transition from Marxism towards a more radically pluralistic 
democratic society. The adverse economic system combined with greater political freedoms 
opened the door for increased civic organization among all members of society.  
 The brutal tactics exercised by militaristic authorities made small, immediate civic 
organizations almost a necessity. “Civil Society was born out of the experience of fear… In a 
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situation of an enormous ideological complexity, the discovery of civil society was much less a 
question of theory than of necessity” (Weffort as quoted in Baker 57). The extreme nationalism 
exercised by the military also caused questioning among the left’s own statist ideology. The 
work of Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci helped articulate the new direction. Much 
of the core of Gramsci’s work advocated the construction of popular resistance through civic 
organizations distinct from the state and economy. These institutions (churches, trade unions, 
neighborhood groups) combined to help divert the accumulation of centralized government 
power in acting as a major counter-balance (Baker 58). Additionally, civil society provides an 
organized channel for political parties to disseminate ideas and coalesce common interests. 
Guerilla movements appeared vulnerable whereas widespread nonviolent organization could be 
much more formidable. 
 Unfortunately, the turn towards democracy in the 1980s did not prove to be the answer to 
the persistent problems of Latin America. Often known as the “Lost Decade,” the 1980s saw 
massive debt, economic slowdown, unemployment and inflation for many countries. Suddenly 
citizens grew weary of the elitist government and educated intellectuals that sold complex 
economic theories as the answer to the nation’s problems. The newfound freedoms fostered 
greater mobilization among citizens of common background. By the 1990s, an identifiable 
culprit emerged: neoliberal economics (Vanden 43). The traditional political systems that had 
welcomed these policies were leaving behind the vast majorities of their people while enriching a 
select few.  The current mobilizations are very different from the popular uprisings of the 
previous era. Higher levels of literacy and greater access to education have shifted the preference 
from radical revolution to nonviolent mobilization. One of the most powerful determinants of 
civic participation and support for democracy is education (Seligson et al. 37). As governments 
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expanded educational opportunities, their citizens, in turn, pushed for greater institutional 
reforms Additionally, mass communication technology and low cost access to the internet allows 
a social movement to recruit membership, organize an internal structure, and gain international 
visibility (Vanden 44).   
 
The Creation and Function of Social Movements 
Civil society is often referred to as the aggregate of a country’s civic and social 
organizations and institutions not affiliated with the state (though in practice, a complex 
relationship often emerges). These organizations are formed through an association of similar 
interests, behaviors, or values in an effort to raise awareness and alter public policy. Examples of 
civil society groups include faith-based organizations, advocacy coalitions, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), trade unions, social movements (indigenous), business associations, or 
registered charities. It is often believed that a strong civil society is a key component of a 
functioning democracy. The government must be responsive to these demands in establishing a 
cooperative relationship with civil society and the individuals represented. Civic organizations 
enact change through two distinctive operations – one within, and one outside the country’s 
established political system.  
 Within the political system, strong civil actors may aggregate interests among broad 
sectors of the population in forming a political party with electoral goals. In order to achieve 
their primary function of winning elections, political parties must negotiate and appeal to a wide 
audience (Schonwalder 5). Political parties have the obvious advantage of establishing a physical 
presence within the policy formation process. However, representatives of civic organizations 
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with specific interests may prove too stubborn or idealistic to successfully negotiate the 
complexity of party politics. Entering the electoral realm may also require a hierarchical 
structure that can fracture the democratic connections upon which a social organization founded 
itself. Candidates may renege on campaign promises once in office further deteriorating their 
organized constituent base. Nonetheless, a direct representative presents the best opportunity to 
influencing policy. 
Outside the political system, a civic organization may lobby for change through the 
creation of a social movement. While social movements are notoriously difficult to define, they 
require a degree of sustainability, geographic magnitude, and a coherent platform challenging the 
prevailing power structure. It is not enough to organize a short-term campaign of street protests; 
a social movement derives influence from continuity (Encarnacion 360). It is only from a robust 
civil society that powerful social movements can be generated to the point where politicians have 
no choice but to heed the demands. While traditional perspectives viewed social movements as 
the result of an inarticulate frustration, contemporary research suggests that these movements are 
composed of rational, socially active individuals who are well integrated into the community. 
Their general support from the media (in the recent democratic era) has helped legitimize their 
cause and amplify their voice on an international scale. Today in Latin America, social 
movements are an established aspect of the political system (IADB 112).  
Although they take on numerous forms in different regions, street protesting appears to 
be the most visible and influential lobbying mechanism in Latin America. Due to Latin 
America’s long history of elite rule, demonstrations are almost always composed or poor and 
working class individuals (IADB 113). Thus, effective movements help expand the inclusiveness 
of a country’s democracy by further incorporating marginalized groups. At the same time, 
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however, protests are also indicative of an institutional shortage by which citizens may voice 
their demands. Using their strength of numbers, a protest may jam major channels of 
transportation (take over airports, block roadways, march through main city plazas, etc) and 
effectively halt local economic production. In order to contain the protests, governments may 
dispatch law enforcement or the military expending considerable state resources in the process. 
Unfortunately, the stand-off occasionally ends in violence as the national government grows 
impatient and authorizes the use of force to dispel the demonstrators.  
While social movements exhibit several positive characteristics, they can also generate a 
destabilizing effect that undermines the nation’s overall political health. Until very recently, 
Latin America was plagued by authoritarian governance and revolutionary fervor echoed among 
the lower classes. Social organization was often limited to radical fringe groups that advocated 
violent overthrow of the national government. This legacy still persists, to a lesser degree, in 
modern social movements. Instead of being proactive and methodically working towards a 
feasible agenda, social movements may often be reactive when policy opposes their interests. 
Social movements can quickly devolve into violent protests which paralyze the country and 
leave the national government in a particularly difficult situation (IADB 120). The movement 
may rejoice when leaders resign to pressure, but this can create a vulnerable political vacuum 
that allows unelected leaders to assume power. Because Andean democracy is still in a 
vulnerable, experimental stage, the continuous political failure only cripples the nation’s faith in 
the overall system (IADB 121). However, with the severe representational shortcomings of a 
nascent democracy, perhaps forceful social movements are the only means of establishing an 
audible voice. 
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Peru: The Struggle for Collective Mobilization 
Compared to the other Andean countries with high Indigenous populations (Ecuador and 
Bolivia), the mobilization among Peruvian Amerindians is relatively low. Currently Peru’s 
indigenous comprise roughly 45% of the total population consisting of two main ethnic groups 
residing primarily in the highlands – the Quechua and the Aymara. Researchers attribute this to 
multiple factors. First, there are enormous physical barriers in Peru that placed challenges on 
establishing a common identity. By the late twentieth century, nearly 10 million indigenous 
people had moved to urban areas concentrated on the Pacific Coast (primarily in Lima). 
Furthermore, research on Andean culture indicates that separate communities tend to classify one 
another as uniquely different. One community member will sometimes regard the member of 
another community as distinct in identity (Thorp 468).  
Historical factors have also placed additional obstruction on mobilization. The Shining 
Path (Sendero Luminoso) movement paralyzed much of the country especially in rural areas of 
Amerindian concentration. The paranoia left over from this era caused the Fujimori regime to 
quash opposing political organization by demonizing them as enemies of the state. The rhetoric 
effectively constrained collective action among the indigenous (Van Cott 226). Also, during the 
pinnacle of the Shining Path’s reign of terror, many other Latin American countries were 
receiving a large number of foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These NGOs were 
focused on increasing the political visibility of indigenous groups and providing the resources to 
foster their growth and development. The obvious danger in Peru prevented many NGOs from 
establishing offices in the country. Thus, the indigenous Peruvians were never subjected to this 
informal education that gave Ecuador and Bolivia a head start (Van Cott 229).    
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We begin our contemporary history with the 1990 election which saw the rise of a new 
curious leader born of Japanese descent. Alberto Fujimori decided to abandon political parties 
altogether calling himself a “man of the people.” The campaign strategy worked well, and 
Fujimori introduced a new restructuring program aimed at attracting foreign investment (Burt et 
al. 260). Fujimori’s lack of experience and overall knowledge regarding politics made him 
especially more attracted by authoritarianism. His initial success in counteracting hyperinflation 
and bringing the Shining Path movement under control earned him the necessary political capital 
to perform the autogolpe (auto-coup). This massive shut-down of Congress effectively buried 
established political parties making it Fujimori versus “the opposition” – a leaderless and largely 
unorganized group. In the constituent assembly elections held in late 1992, 85% of the vote went 
to Fujimori supporters or independent candidates. Throughout the decade, political parties 
remained a fleeting phenomenon built only around election time and quickly dissolved afterward 
(Levitsky 10). 
Meanwhile, civilian institutions lost considerable power and political parties found little 
support as allegations of corruption became more apparent. Throughout the 1980s, the 
hyperinflation and political violence inflicted by Sendero Luminoso mitigated the salience of 
nonviolent social movements (typically arising from the poor and working class). The gradual 
decline and ultimate failure of IU, the party of the left, gave social movements no political 
apparatus to sound their voice. The situation only deteriorated further under Fujimori who 
strongly denounced collective action (calling those who spoke out a “terrorist”) and undermined 
social movements in many ways. For example, Fujimori sought to magnify the direct 
relationship between the national government and the personal individual by directly handing out 
government aid and foodstuffs to the poor masses and bypassing grassroots organizations that 
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originally formed to serve exactly this purpose (Burt et al. 264). Additionally, Fujimori created 
new government agencies that began a subtle process of cooptation of the preexisting local civic 
organizations. The President completely turned his back on established social movements 
rendering them almost nonexistent throughout his first and second term (Crabtree 376). Thus, 
Fujimori was able to construct an authoritarian system with virtually no governmental checks 
and balances to mitigate his power. Many citizens were in favor of his repressive style as a 
means of controlling the chaos caused by previous regimes. Despite the clear weakening of 
democratic institutions, public approval for the President skyrocketed from 53 to 81 percent in 
1992.  
 By the late 1990s Fujimori’s incompetence became undeniable and economic conditions 
disfavored the once-empowered working classes. His unconstitutional reelection in 2000 
initiated a mass reawakening of civil society. Many women and student organizations protested 
regularly outside the Presidential Palace in Lima. On July 28, Fujimori dispatched the armed 
forces with destructive results killing 6 individuals and wounding hundreds more. The tragedy 
worked to further delegitimize the presidency while showcasing the influence of demonstrations 
organized through civil society (Burt 3). After a bribery scandal went public, Fujimori was 
forced to resign and fled the country ushering in the leadership of Alejandro Toledo. By this 
time, however, Peru’s democracy lay in shambles and citizens were extremely frustrated by the 
country’s complete reverse in development. “The Fujimori regime bequeathed to the next 
administration a populace even more cynical toward government, having stripped away the 
institutions necessary for effective and representative democratic governance” (Arredondo 75). 
As a mestizo, Toledo’s capture of the presidency represented a huge victory for 
indigenous peoples of Peru. Rather than continue Fujimori’s autocratic style, Toledo rendered 
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himself powerless under constant capitulation. This time, it would be social protests that would 
overwhelm the government into ineffectiveness. As soon as Alejandro Toledo began departing 
from his campaign promises, workers in public transport immediately staged a series of strikes in 
the southern city of Arequipa. The Arequipazo, as it came to be called, became a national symbol 
for the renewed power of collective action and quickly spread to surrounding areas(Arredondo 
78). Eventually indigenous Amazonians would organize a stout resistance to a government plan 
that would open large swaths of rainforest land to privatized logging. The protesters blocked all 
forms of local transportation forcing Toledo to call a state of emergency in May 2003 and 
temporarily suspend many civil liberties. With the lack of institutional channels to voice their 
demands, the protests only grew in intensity as teachers, farmers, health care workers, judiciary 
workers, and union members (Arredondo 81) all joined in the demonstrations.  
Each of the frustrated groups seemed to be expressing a similar sentiment: the free-
market reforms of previous years had not solved their problems. The macroeconomic growth of 
the previous decade had not been shared equally and citizens were finally responding. Civil 
groups expressed deep disenchantment with their government’s continuous failures and 
corruption scandals. The 2006 elections reflected this frustration with the reelection of Alan 
Garcia as “the lesser of two evils” (Thorpe 326). Currently approval ratings for Alan Garcia are 
abysmally low. According to Peru’s Institute of Public Opinion, about 27% of Peruvian citizens 
feel that Garcia is doing an adequate job with 67% strongly disapproving (Institute of Public 
Opinion 5). The fierce discontent with the Peruvian Government stands in stark contrast to many 
other Latin American countries where new left-leaning Presidents have enjoyed moderate to high 
approval ratings.  
15 
 
While political parties, especially APRA, have recently rebounded, their support remains 
diminished. Without a strong party system, voters must often confront a confusing array of 
candidates with no identifiable labels or categorizations. Because political parties exist beyond 
each election, they can develop long-term structural goals as opposed to a politician’s focus on 
short-term approval to gain reelection. While Peru has not experienced a complete breakdown, 
the ineffectiveness of political parties has hindered the creation of strong grassroots 
organizations and decreased civic engagement (Arredondo 83). This is one of the major reasons 
why individuals like Alan Garcia are able to obtain power after miserably failing in his first term. 
Peruvian social movements missed a golden opportunity to elect a member of their ranks to  
power following the resignation of Alejandro Toledo. Popular protest had brought about his 
demise, but failed to capitalize on the opportunistic environment that lacked strong political 
parties. 
The 2011 general election appears to be promising thus far. Because no candidate 
received more than half of the votes in the general election, a run-off election is currently 
scheduled for June 5th. The current front-runner, Ollanta Humala, is the son ethnic indigenous 
lawyer who was a member of the Communist Party of Peru. Humala led a similar life joining the 
military and at one point leading a revolt against the Fujimori regime in 2000. His party, Gana 
Peru, is a coalition of several left-leaning political parties representing the indigenous poor and 
working classes. Humala has gained considerable support from the other left-leaning presidents 
of South America including Evo Morales (Portocarrero 12). Surprisingly his opponent, Keiko 
Fujimori, is the daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori who is currently imprisoned. 
They represent the bitter regional economic debate with Lima and the Pacific coast favoring 
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Fujimori’s free-market principles and the people of the Andean highlands calling for Humala’s 
socialist nationalization (Carroll).  
The subtle reemergence of political parties has helped social movements regain their 
confidence by offering a more direct channel to the national government. Though organization 
on the scale of other Latin American countries (Bolivia and Ecuador) remains elusive, the 
number of civic groups in Peruvian society has undoubtedly increased. Recent research indicates 
that foreign direct investment is the number one cause of demonstration, number two being local 
government corruption (Arce 42). Unfortunately, many of these groups tend to act in isolation 
and often only produce localized effects that never reach national prominence (Schonwalder 10). 
One particularly powerful organization, AIDESEP, has united six indigenous groups from 
around the country under a singular mobilization. Although the massacre in June 2009 was very 
debilitating, the organization was ultimately successful in repealing the “law of the Jungle” 
giving private corporations free access to exploit the land’s natural resources. For many 
Peruvians, AIDESEP has inspired a new age of civic involvement and how powerful individuals 
can be when they unite on common ground. 
 
 
Bolivia: Capitalizing on the Wave of Popular Sentiment 
With the largest percentage of indigenous peoples in Latin America, Bolivia is one of the 
most important examples of the power of collective action through strong civic organizations. 
The country is highly regionalized with Indians concentrated in the Andean highlands and 
wealthy landowners residing in the east. As expected, Bolivia possesses extremely high levels of 
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income inequality and the largest percentage of impoverished peoples in Latin America. These 
socioeconomic conditions create a ripe environment for robust civil society marked by regular, 
widespread protest. In recent years, indigenous citizens finally achieved a significant political 
gain after years of persistent marginalization.  The first indigenous president of Latin America, 
Evo Morales, was elected to power in 2006 and continues to enjoy widespread approval 
especially among his indigenous constituency. To understand Bolivia’s democratic evolution, we 
must first examine its history in determining the roots of social organization and resistance. 
 Bolivia’s economy has historically evolved around a very limited set of industries leaving 
them particularly vulnerable to global demand. In colonial times, Bolivia’s immense silver 
deposits were completely ransacked by the Spanish empire while devastating the country’s local 
labor supply. Similarly, Bolivia’s tin industry grew to prominence after independence but was 
also mostly exported to the gain of wealthier nations. In recent years, this same extraction of 
natural wealth was justified by the guise of neoliberalism that pervaded the global conscious 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. During this time, many Latin American countries became 
saddled with intractably high debts due to rising oil prices and development loans from the 
World Bank and IMF. The international financial community responded by encouraging the 
government to scale back its involvement in the economy and reducing its expenditures on 
subsidies and welfare. Many large industries (including those based on raw material extraction) 
were privatized and greater foreign investment was encouraged. Though these policies did help 
to curb inflation and reign in foreign capital, most scholars agree that neo-liberalism “has 
generated pervasive market failures, new forms of social polarization, and a dramatic 
intensification of uneven development at all spatial scales” (Larson et al. 10).  
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  Since the dawn of the 21st century, Bolivia’s active network of left-leaning civic 
organizations has powerfully exercised its political muscle. The recent social movements were 
initially focused on the economic concerns associated with neoliberalism, but quickly targeted 
the political system as an area where systemic change could occur. Throughout the early 2000s, 
diverse sectors of the population were repeatedly mobilized to protest the privatization of two 
fundamental natural resources – natural gas and water. The political party Movimiento al 
Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism or MAS) capitalized on the prevailing national 
conscious and assimilated the different social movements under a common platform and 
candidate.  The successful resistance created an atmosphere ripe for the unprecedented 
ascendency of indigenous leader Evo Morales. 
 For Bolivia’s relatively fragile economy, the discovery of large gas reserves in the late 
1990s suddenly made the country a key regional economic player.  Demand for natural gas in the 
neighboring countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay had been continuously growing. 
The privatization of this industry reduced royalty fees from 50% to 18%, a giveaway that could 
cost the government millions in revenues. In September 2003, massive revolts took place led by 
the Aymara indigenous peasantry concentrated in the altiplano and Lake Titicaca regions. The 
government responded with brute force, upsetting thousands more. As middle class residents of 
La Paz staged hunger strikes, President Sanchez de Lozada was forced to flee the country amidst 
500,000 marching the streets effectively paralyzing the country.  
While Vice President Carlos Mesa initially aligned himself with the resistance, he 
abruptly moved towards the right when wealthy citizens of the Santa Cruz region lashed out. 
Once again, widespread protests broke out in the capital city forcing Carlos Mesa out of power 
and the subsequent signing of the hydrocarbons law which returned legal ownership of gas 
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reserves to the state. In practice the law did not nationalize gas but rather increased the price that 
foreign countries must pay for Bolivian gas. While the policy has significantly increased state 
revenues, it is indicative of a more underlying problem. The signing of new progressive laws 
may be widely celebrated, but they are rarely implemented as promised or faithfully executed.  
 In September 1999, Bolivia leased off the city of Cochabamba’s (pop. 600,000) water 
supply to the California engineering giant, Bechtel. Within weeks, Cochabambans were slapped 
with rate increases up to 200% (Schultz, 2003). Even the very poorest in the region, which 
Bechtel claimed would only face 10% increases, experienced hikes of 60% for the most basic 
rate. Immediately, residents fought back with a city wide strike and shut down Cochabamba for 
three days until the government agreed to review the water bills. The government then retracted 
its comments and sent 1200 heavily armed guards to the protesters in the city square unleashing 
bullets and teargas onto their citizens wounding 75 people and killing one. Despite the violence, 
residents continued to protest as National TV broadcasted the injustice leading to an international 
outcry. Bechtel’s officials soon fled the country and a new publicly owned company was 
installed to manage the water supply (Shultz 32). 
 While the fight to maintain water as a public commodity was successful, it was largely 
organized around regional borders with specified interests. The natural gas issues touched on 
every demographic within the country and emerged as a resource of structural significance to 
Bolivia’s political economy. The resistance against privatizing natural gas presented an 
opportunity to combine diverse interests and lay the foundations for a broader movement that 
may extend across borders. A for-profit water industry had little chance of survival as it is 
commonly viewed as a human right with a large international coalition. Natural gas possesses no 
comparable network, yet still remains a critical natural resource with far-reaching consequences. 
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“Such self-organization of the popular classes to hit capital where it seriously hurts serves as an 
example for social movements struggling for economic and social justice throughout the Third 
World” (Spronk & Webber 40).  
 Unlike Ecuador or Peru, Bolivia’s extremely organized society can unite quickly and 
effectively given the right circumstances. While a variant of the Movimiento al Socialismo party 
had been in existence since the early 1990s, the events of the early 2000s helped them become a 
nationally recognized political force. In addition to the water and gas wars, the Aymara 
Uprisings and coca grower’s struggle in Chepare (Morales led this movement) demanded 
increased attention for the large indigenous-peasant social class. Each of these movements, while 
different in nature, encountered a common enemy – neoliberal economic policies. Thus, MAS 
was able to capitalize on the new wave of popular sentiment sweeping the country in electing 
Evo Morales to President in 2005.  
MAS initially began with a dual purpose of maintaining its confrontational approach as a 
social movement while also advancing candidates in the political sphere. Though similar to the 
Pachakutik-CONAIE partnership in Ecuador, MAS is one distinct organization that co-opted 
numerous social movements during election time. MAS leadership had long been skeptical of 
reshaping the organization into that of a political party. However, the rise and popularity of Evo 
Morales has catapulted this social movement into the nation’s most powerful governing party. 
Since MAS took power, the populace has developed a deeper satisfaction with democracy. This 
is a significant gain in public sentiment as Andean countries have historically expressed serious 
concerns with democratic institutions. The change in attitudes is obviously attributed to Morales 
and the large indigenous population finally seeing the fruits of their labor.  
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Morales’ administration has kept their promise in being responsive to indigenous and 
working class demands (Madrid et al. 4). Surprisingly, however, the administration’s economic 
policy has taken on a very moderate approach despite the polarizing rhetoric. Morales appears to 
understand that the implementation of radical socialist policies may risk the country’s economic 
competitiveness and hinder capital investment from abroad. Nonetheless, the administration has 
stood by its campaign of reversing the decades of extreme market fundamentalism that has 
ravaged the nation’s inequities (Larson et al. 9). The overall success of the regime is quite 
impressive given Bolivia’s volatile political climate and weak democratic legacy. 
As MAS becomes increasingly institutionalized, the organization has begun moving 
away from its bottom-up grassroots mobilization into a more hierarchical, top-down structure. 
The sustainability of this subtle transformation may prove to be problematic in the future. The 
MAS still claims that it is a government by social movements, yet power has become 
increasingly centralized in the hands of Evo Morales and his group of relatively inexperienced 
associates (Mayorga et al 7). While the indigenous are a clear majority within the population, 
MAS often acts as though they are a hegemony. As a social movement, the confrontational 
approach and sometimes inflammatory rhetoric employed by MAS threatens to alienate other 
parties and harm the institutional-building necessary for a democracy. Not surprisingly, a 
significant resistance movement has developed in the Santa Cruz region of Eastern Bolivia 
where the more right-leaning groups of the population reside (Mayorga et. al 8). Ultimately, 
however, the legitimacy of Morales’ government will rest on whether he can deliver the much 
needed services and employment opportunities to the huge indigenous underclass that remains 
stagnantly impoverished (Larson 10). 
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While MAS faces significant challenges in establishing the permanent foundations of 
democracy, popular mobilization will continue to contribute to Bolivia’s political development. 
Their ability to organize and form coalitions points to a strongly embedded civil society. For 
example, the federation that called for the blockading of roads, the Union of Bolivian Rural 
Workers, was quickly joined by the Coca Growers Federation. Similarly, the Cochabamba 
Coordinating Committee to Defend Water and Life also provided resources as each organization 
came together in forming a highly visible, grassroots campaign. Together, they understand their 
position within a broader transnational movement and strategically broadcast their interests 
through international communication mediums. Their struggle has attracted a major growth of 
non-governmental organizations which only provided more wind to the sails of national 
resistance. Critical to their success, these civic organizations were able to maintain strong 
democratic ties to their constituents making them formidable voting blocs during election time. 
Bolivia proved to be one of the rare countries of Latin America where social movements became 
an instrumental aspect in enacting real, tangible change.  
 
Ecuador: The Struggle for Cohesiveness between Social Movement and Political Party 
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Ecuador’s democratic institutions were largely 
nonexistent. The country was continuously passed over to a variety of military regimes that kept 
citizens (especially poor and working class) alienated from political discourse. However 
Ecuador’s discovery of oil during this period led to great economic expansion with per capita 
income increasing nearly 500% from 1972 to 1979 allowing the national government greater 
operational power. The oil wealth helped transform the capital city of Quito into an area of major 
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economic endeavor. However, the new wealth also exacerbated the growing regional inequality 
and the image of the poor campesino. With the reemergence of democratic rule came economic 
downturn resultant end to the country’s petroleum boom. With GDP falling and inflation rising 
to 52% (highest in Ecuadorean history), the president was coerced into enacting a number of 
financial reforms at the behest of the International Monetary Fund. Not surprisingly, the 
neoliberal policies were met with wide opposition from ordinary citizens. Growing inequality 
made conditions ripe for new forms of civic involvement and activism. In 1986, one of the most 
powerful indigenous organizations of Latin America came into existence.  
The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, or CONAIE, combined 
several regional indigenous organizations under one efficiently run umbrella. Initially, 
CONAIE’s most forceful demand was to rewrite the first article of the national constitution to 
recognize Ecuador’s diverse peoples in forming a pluri-national state. Their motivations also 
stemmed out of an opposition to mainstream political parties that they felt were ignoring 
indigenous sentiment. Electoral politics, they believed, could be corrupting and damaging to 
their organizational unity. Since its inception, CONAIE has fostered a very grassroots type of 
structure, acting as a communicator between the different base organizations spread throughout 
the country. This decentralized system allows local communities to maintain autonomy while 
allowing for rapid mobilization that displays a vast, formidable presence. Locally elected 
officials must take into account their individual CONAIE chapter which helps maintain 
consistent, systematic pressure (Dangl 1). 
 Beginning in the early 1990s, CONAIE organized a series of levantamientos, or 
“uprisings” across the country catapulting the once marginalized class into national spotlight. 
CONAIE represented a new method of fighting the neoliberal policies that swept Latin America 
24 
 
during the 1980s. The protests took the national government by surprise in casting a harsh light 
on the inherent problems associated with the recent economic approach. While the confederation 
remained largely representative of indigenous cultures, CONAIE demonstrated its pragmatism 
by aligning with other popular movements when strategically wise. Suddenly, the poor and 
working class became a voice that commanded political reckoning within Ecuador’s national 
consciousness (Becker 166).  
Although CONAIE had initially forbade its leaders from holding political office (even as 
far as boycotting the Presidential elections of 1992), they quickly reversed that policy in 1995 
through the creation of the Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity. Many local indigenous 
activists had become increasingly vocal about utilizing all tools at their disposal in challenging 
the status quo. Pachakutik formed in a participatory fashion through a horizontal, democratic 
structure that separated it from the traditionally defined political party. True to their CONAIE 
origins, they “embraced principles of community, solidarity, unity, tolerance, and respect” 
(Becker 168) becoming leaders of the Latin America’s New Left. It has been previously assumed 
that political movements formed around ethnic identities could not be successful due to their 
exclusionary nature and inability to meet a diverse range of interests. This is not the case in the 
Andes where the fluidity of ethnic boundaries allows such parties to be successful (Madrid et al. 
6). 
The elections of 1996 brought moderate success for Pachakutik with eight deputies 
elected to congress, two indigenous mayors, and the first indigenous victory at the national level 
by longtime CONAIE leader, Luis Macas. Their presidential candidate placed a close third in the 
first electoral round, yet forced the remaining parties to compete for the indigenous vote helping 
to bring attention to their cause. Subsequent elections only brought continued success for the 
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young party including the 1998 passage of Ecuador’s most progressive constitution to date. In 
the early 2000s, the burgeoning indigenous movement encountered its first internal rift as its 
elected leaders were unable to navigate the political arena successfully in enacting leftist reforms 
(Becker 168). Established political parties had learned to manipulate electoral politics in their 
favor through clientalistic networks, which CONAIE had difficulty overcoming. Though the 
elected President Gutierrez spouted leftist rhetoric during his campaign, he immediately 
abandoned these promises once in office. He actively worked to disband collective indigenous 
interests resulting in major divisions within the once powerful CONAIE organization. Many 
members expressed a desire to return to their roots as a social movement focused on widespread 
street protests. Yet in order to enact tangible policy at the national level, they would have to 
remain involved in the potentially divisive realm of electoral politics.  
 The initial support of Gutierrez had severely weakened CONAIE’s mobilization efforts 
throughout his presidency. The relationship between CONAIE and its political arm, Pachakutik 
began to fracture and the fundamental indigenous base felt alienated. The party lost several seats 
in local and national governments. In late 2004, CONAIE elected longtime leader Luis Macas as 
president. Macas made the critical decision to return the organization to its social movement 
origins spurring a series of grassroots efforts to resist free-trade agreements and private contracts 
granted to multinational corporations (Becker 172). Despite these indigenous led protests, it was 
the mestizo middle class that finally toppled the Gutierrez regime after widespread revolt erupted 
in Quito in April, 2005. CONAIE’s divisional issues persisted into the 2006 elections as its 
presidential candidate, Macas, could only garner a dismal 2% of the vote. A reporter of the 
Guardian noted, “When it comes to the vote, it appears that most of the indigenous population 
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does not trust one of their own. They clearly prefer to vote for a white man who, they probably 
believe, may well be able to deliver the jobs and housing they crave” (Gott 1).  
While tangible representation proved elusive, CONAIE and its constituents were still able 
to elect a left-leaning president, Rafael Correa. His opponent, a banana magnate and Ecuador’s 
richest man, possessed strong connections to oligarchic interests and neoliberal economic 
policies. CONAIE perceived the threat and successfully conveyed it to the masses in launching 
Correa to power. The relationship between the President and indigenous constituents has been 
somewhat strained in light of his left-leaning ideology. Movements were initially hesitant to act 
out against unfavorable policies so as not to strengthen the political right. After repeated failures, 
CONAIE finally severed ties with the president claiming, “Correa has assumed the traditional 
neoliberal posture of the rightist oligarchy” (Denvir). The 2009 election brought greater woes for 
CONAIE capturing only 1.36% of the vote or four seats in Congress (CountryWatch). While the 
President seemed to be enjoying general support, a recent coup attempt in October of 2010 
threatened the country’s political stability. The coup was initiated by police following the 
passage of austerity measures that would reduce their pay (despite significant raises in police 
wages over the course of Correa’s presidency). While Correa was restored to power, the event 
shocked the populace and exemplified the lingering vulnerability of a democratically elected 
president. 
 The transition from a grassroots social movement to an electoral apparatus presented 
several complications. Rather than operating freely as a private organization within civil society, 
a political party is tasked with navigating the often corrupt, clientalistic environment of electoral 
politics. Pachakutik quickly realized how difficult it was to transfer specific interests into 
national policy with little or no knowledge of national politics. Political savvy requires extensive 
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experience and flexibility. While CONAIE found success in disrupting the national 
government’s implementation of certain neoliberal policies, Pachakutik was unable to foster 
more fundamental change working within the system. 
 
Analysis  
 While each social movement demonstrated considerable strength, the demands they 
requested face a very innate problem in the social structure of each country. One of the major 
underlying problems of the government’s persistent failure devolves from the natural labor 
composition of the region. In Peru and Bolivia, more than 50% of the Gross National Product is 
derived from the informal sector of the economy (Schneider 11). Essentially this refers to the 
parts of the economy that aren’t taxed or monitored by the government. The large labor 
population working in this sector severely reduces the tax base of the nation and weakens the 
funding for necessary public services. For example, during the Toledo Presidency "some 70% of 
output falls within the grey or "informal" economy, and thus escapes tax. Tax-collections, at 
below 12.1% of GDP, are stagnant, with most coming from a handful of large, formal 
companies. Evasion is widespread, particularly among better-paid independent professionals" 
(“The Americas: Running Out of Options; Peru”). Thus, the government simply had no means of 
supplying the wages promised to civil servants. The problem is endemic throughout the Andean 
region and is a major reason why social movements demanding greater social welfare have not 
found success. Governments are locked into circumstances where they simply lack the resources 
to provide for their people.   
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 Social movements, especially in Bolivia, have exercised considerable power in shifting 
political debate. Their actions can foster a chaotic environment where political leaders are forced 
to step down. Yet, more often than not, the incoming leader emerges from the status quo but 
disguises himself behind new, lofty rhetoric. Bolivia is one of the few countries in Latin America 
that broke this historic trend by electing an actual representative of the masses. Although 
Bolivia’s natural demographic (indigenous majority) is an inherent advantage for ethnic 
organizing, these social movements assumed an agenda-setting role as opposed to simply vetoing 
policy as it came (IADB 117). The movements remained persistent through small victories 
working proactively towards systemic reform. However, there is indication that these groups 
have gone dormant with their new indigenous leader in power while right-wing groups in the 
Santa Cruz region have escalated resistance.  
 One continuous theme we have noticed in each country (especially Ecuador) is the 
apparent difficulty of transforming a social movement into a political party. The movement often 
loses its participatory democratic structure and centralizes power through a rigid hierarchy. 
When constituents notice the change, the movement’s cohesiveness begins to collapse, 
effectively fracturing the indigenous-peasant voice. In the case of CONAIE, the Pachakutik 
political party began to alienate its base when candidates ignored campaign promises and fell 
into corruption scandals. However, an organized political party is the only true method of 
gaining access to policymaking. Without representation in the official system, social movements 
are confined to interruptive demonstrations that can easily be ignored by politicians.  
 The lack of collective interest aggregation among Peru’s lower working classes has 
allowed status quo individuals to continually obtain power. There is reason to believe that if Peru 
had the level of civic organization as seen in Bolivia and Ecuador, political circumstances would 
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be far different today. The conditions that precipitated the rise of Evo Morales were mirrored in 
Peru following the decline of Alejandro Toledo. However, Peru lacked a centralized organization 
like CONAIE (Pachakutik) or Movimiento al Socialismo. While demonstrations took place, 
strong, persistent social movements never materialized. Thus, protests were largely reactionary 
and lacked a visible organization to express the sentiments of the people (Arce 40). When 
matters were settled, the protests disappeared and business could resume as usual without 
pressure for government accountability. The indigenous group, AIDESEP, had not yet 
established the strong constituency connections that are necessary for mass mobilization. Thus, 
Alan Garcia emerged as the “lesser of two evils.” However, this trend seems to be reversing in 
the latest election as leftist political parties have united together in support of indigenous leader 
Ollanta Humala.  
Though Peru has not fostered the robust civic environments found in other Andean 
countries, they possess a higher human development index ranking 63rd overall compared to 
Ecuador (77th) and Bolivia (95th) (ECLAC 2010). While it may not be an accurate measure of 
overall citizen happiness, the report places significant weight on economic indicators – Peru’s 
area of greatest success. Similarly, measurements of Peru’s political institutions (Freedom 
House, Political Risk Index) also indicate greater success. Peru’s booming tourism industry may 
partially account for some of this success gaining international exposure and forcing the 
government to assume the democratic characteristics of its Western customers.  
What is perhaps most disheartening about Peru’s current condition is the low, 
continuously declining public support for democracy. On a scale of 0 to 100, Peru possesses a 
60.1 (down from 65.5 two years ago) - the lowest support for democracy in the region (Carrion 
et al. xxvi). Both Peru’s citizenry and elected representatives appear to be in agreement as less 
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than 50% from both groups indicated their satisfaction with democracy (Corral 4). The report 
found that the variable with the highest impact on democratic support was perceptions of 
government success or failure in combatting poverty and unemployment. The country is 
currently in a critical period that demands greater civic participation in order to cultivate the 
seeds of democracy. Bolivia and Ecuador are already moving in the right path with support for 
democracy steadily rising at 70.3 and 68.4, respectively. These positive attitudes are largely 
attributed to the high levels of social organization found in both countries (Seligson et al. 37). As 
previously discussed, it is suggested that this general will eventually help Bolivia and Ecuador 
catch up to Peru in terms of political stability and civic freedoms. 
 
Conclusion 
While the three Andean countries share a common cultural identity, they do not share a 
uniform development pattern. Each nation is a product of its unique history, geographical 
landscape, and human population. Nonetheless, the nations of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia appear 
to be moving in a positive direction toward obtaining strong democratic institutions and a better 
standard of living for all its citizens. Revolutionary guerilla groups have been replaced by 
nonviolent civic organizations that stress economic empowerment and participatory governance. 
While the future appears bright for each nation, several obstacles still lay in their path. As one of 
the most organic of human institutions, social movements possess a unique opportunity to 
spearhead the deepening of democracy 
The results of my research, however, remain largely mixed. In some cases, social 
movements have rearranged the entire political order of a country and given newfound 
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representation to the traditionally marginalized classes. In other cases, independent social 
movements failed to collectivize and could not make significant gains in advancing favorable. 
Nonetheless every country appears to be moving in the direction of increasing organization and 
political representation that take the indigenous poor into account. Undoubtedly social 
movements have, thus far, played a critical role in the national conscious of each Andean 
country. While the electoral gains were sometimes insignificant, the presence they established on 
the streets had the power to paralyze economic activity and earn the respect of national 
governments. 
 Today’s social movements have taken advantage of the available technology in 
promoting their cause internationally. For example, one movement, La Via Campesina (literally 
“the peasant way), is now visible on five different continents and currently represents over 150 
million people globally. Initially organizing around a platform of sustainable agriculture and 
“food sovereignty,” they have become one of the leading voices in the proliferating anti-
globalization movement. They were also major players in helping to topple unresponsive 
governments as seen in Ecuador in 2000 and Bolivia in 2003. The increased visibility has placed 
tremendous pressure on national governments to either reform or risk global humiliation. The 
organization maintains tight, formal coordination and has surprisingly maintained its autonomy 
and pluralistic roots. La Via Campesina become an international symbol of economic justice 
(Torres et al. 308). 
As the Andean nations continue in their path towards democracy, the responsibility of 
civil society is ever heightened. Even in the midst of significant gains, now is the time to push 
harder. Now is the time for increased mobilization, for greater international advocacy. The 
prevailing trend indicates these people can no longer be ignored. Together the indigenous 
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underclass of the Andes has become a powerful regional force. As renowned scholarly Sidney 
Tarrow notes, “Transnational activism does not resemble a swelling tide of history but is more 
like a series of waves that lap onto an international beach, retreating repeatedly into domestic 
seas but leaving incremental changes on shore” (58). 
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